2024
May
wiiw: Foreign Capital in Russia: Taking Stock after Two Years of War, Russia Monitor 5
Unlike most other countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe, even prior to the war Russia’s economic model was not really based on attracting foreign direct investment. On top of that, many of the Western firms announced plans to withdraw following the country’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, two years after the war began, only 9.5% of foreign companies have fully exited Russia, while another 32.2% have curtailed their Russian operations. The exodus of foreign capital has slowed markedly over time, to a large degree due to the progressive tightening of the regulatory hurdles for exit. In general, foreign companies that have stayed find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the regulatory hurdles, the unfavourable exit terms and the non-negligible risk of nationalisation make exit a difficult, costly and potentially risky move; on the other hand, the decision to stay is fraught with risks of its own.
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Unlike most other countries of Central, East and Southeast Europe, even prior to the war Russia’s economic model was not really based on attracting foreign direct investment. On top of that, many of the Western firms announced plans to withdraw following the country’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. However, two years after the war began, only 9.5% of foreign companies have fully exited Russia, while another 32.2% have curtailed their Russian operations. The exodus of foreign capital has slowed markedly over time, to a large degree due to the progressive tightening of the regulatory hurdles for exit. In general, foreign companies that have stayed find themselves between a rock and a hard place. On the one hand, the regulatory hurdles, the unfavourable exit terms and the non-negligible risk of nationalisation make exit a difficult, costly and potentially risky move; on the other hand, the decision to stay is fraught with risks of its own.
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February
ifo Institute / EconPol Europe: Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy, Quarterly Report Vol. 2
In 2023, Russia experienced a 3.5% economic growth, but forecasts for 2024 indicate a slowdown to 1.5% due to tightened monetary policies and the expected global economic slowdown. Despite large military spending and Western energy sanctions eroding budget revenues, fiscal deficits have been generally kept under control. Intensified scrutiny of third-country firms violating energy sanctions widened discounts on Russian oil prices in late 2023. Generally, Russian import patterns remained relatively stable. In particular, EU exports of economically critical and common high priority goods to Russia in November 2023 represent just 2% of its prewar levels, underscoring the effectiveness of sanctions in halting direct exports. Besides China and Hong Kong, Türkiye and CIS countries became vital suppliers, meeting Russia's demand for economically critical goods and high-priority items.
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In 2023, Russia experienced a 3.5% economic growth, but forecasts for 2024 indicate a slowdown to 1.5% due to tightened monetary policies and the expected global economic slowdown. Despite large military spending and Western energy sanctions eroding budget revenues, fiscal deficits have been generally kept under control. Intensified scrutiny of third-country firms violating energy sanctions widened discounts on Russian oil prices in late 2023. Generally, Russian import patterns remained relatively stable. In particular, EU exports of economically critical and common high priority goods to Russia in November 2023 represent just 2% of its prewar levels, underscoring the effectiveness of sanctions in halting direct exports. Besides China and Hong Kong, Türkiye and CIS countries became vital suppliers, meeting Russia's demand for economically critical goods and high-priority items.
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Russia Circumventing Sanctions via CIS Countries and Turkey
Press release, February 21, 2024
Press release (english) Press release (german)
Press release, February 21, 2024
Press release (english) Press release (german)
wiiw: Russia’s Economy on the Eve of the Second Anniversary of the War, Russia Monitor 4
Nearly two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the report gives an overview of the current state of the Russian economy, with a focus on the fiscal situation, external balances, and the effects of Western sanctions on Russia’s trade with the EU and selected third countries. Increased scrutiny of companies from third countries violating the energy sanctions led to a renewed widening of the price discount on Russian oil during the last few months of 2023. However, despite this and heavy military spending, last year’s fiscal deficit was kept under control and primarily covered from the sovereign National Welfare Fund. EU exports to Russia of sanctioned economically critical (EC) goods and common high-priority (CHP) items have virtually stalled, indicating that the sanctions are effectively preventing direct exports. However, third countries, notably China, Hong Kong, Türkiye and the CIS countries, have increased their market shares and become Russia’s most important suppliers of missing EC goods and CHP items. Our findings suggest a particularly high likelihood of sanctions evasion via such CIS countries as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent via Türkiye and China.
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Nearly two years after the start of the war in Ukraine, the report gives an overview of the current state of the Russian economy, with a focus on the fiscal situation, external balances, and the effects of Western sanctions on Russia’s trade with the EU and selected third countries. Increased scrutiny of companies from third countries violating the energy sanctions led to a renewed widening of the price discount on Russian oil during the last few months of 2023. However, despite this and heavy military spending, last year’s fiscal deficit was kept under control and primarily covered from the sovereign National Welfare Fund. EU exports to Russia of sanctioned economically critical (EC) goods and common high-priority (CHP) items have virtually stalled, indicating that the sanctions are effectively preventing direct exports. However, third countries, notably China, Hong Kong, Türkiye and the CIS countries, have increased their market shares and become Russia’s most important suppliers of missing EC goods and CHP items. Our findings suggest a particularly high likelihood of sanctions evasion via such CIS countries as Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and to a lesser extent via Türkiye and China.
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wiiw: Navigating Trade Restrictions, Russia Monitor 3
This report focuses on Russia's adaptation in its commodity exports during 2023, amidst ongoing international sanctions. It examines the shifts in export and maritime shipping patterns, emphasizing coal, crude oil, and liquefied natural gas, and their redirection towards alternative, non-sanctioning markets. The analysis details Russia's efforts to maintain its commodity exports by leveraging new maritime routes and - possibly - spoofing Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals to avoid detection of ship-to-ship transfers of oil.
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This report focuses on Russia's adaptation in its commodity exports during 2023, amidst ongoing international sanctions. It examines the shifts in export and maritime shipping patterns, emphasizing coal, crude oil, and liquefied natural gas, and their redirection towards alternative, non-sanctioning markets. The analysis details Russia's efforts to maintain its commodity exports by leveraging new maritime routes and - possibly - spoofing Automatic Identification System (AIS) signals to avoid detection of ship-to-ship transfers of oil.
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January
ifo Institute / EconPol Europe: Monitoring the Impact of Sanctions on the Russian Economy, Quarterly Report Vol. 1
Despite EU restrictions, only around one-third of pre-war exports to Russia are fully sanctioned; most trade remains unaffected or subject to numerous exemptions. While exports have decreased by 32%, imports have increased by 17% due to innovative ways to bypass trade sanctions. China is Russia’s most important alternative country of origin for products under sanction: 61 percent of all products subject to sanctions come from China. The Russian economy shows signs of recovery, driven by robust domestic demand from wartime fiscal stimulus, contributing about 10% to GDP in 2022-23. Real GDP and industrial production have grown by 2.5% and 3%, respectively, indicating recovery from the economic crisis.
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Despite EU restrictions, only around one-third of pre-war exports to Russia are fully sanctioned; most trade remains unaffected or subject to numerous exemptions. While exports have decreased by 32%, imports have increased by 17% due to innovative ways to bypass trade sanctions. China is Russia’s most important alternative country of origin for products under sanction: 61 percent of all products subject to sanctions come from China. The Russian economy shows signs of recovery, driven by robust domestic demand from wartime fiscal stimulus, contributing about 10% to GDP in 2022-23. Real GDP and industrial production have grown by 2.5% and 3%, respectively, indicating recovery from the economic crisis.
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EU Exports to Russia Down to 37 Percent of Prewar Level
Press release, January 09, 2024
Press release (english) Press release (german)
Press release, January 09, 2024
Press release (english) Press release (german)
wiiw: Fighting Depreciation and Inflationary Pressures, Russia Monitor 2
The Russian authorities have been battling strong depreciation pressures, with the rouble having lost around 30% of its value since early 2023 (and inflationary pressures having risen strongly). The main reason for this is the declining supply of foreign exchange from foreign trade transactions, due to (i) a steady rise in the share of export contracts denominated in roubles, and (ii) the declining share of export earnings in foreign currency converted into roubles. To address the latter problem, on 16 October the authorities imposed a surrender requirement for export proceeds, which has proved highly effective at stabilising the exchange rate. However, despite this and a sharp rise in the policy rate of 7.5 pp in total since June, inflation has continued to accelerate, reflecting the ongoing expansionary fiscal stance, but also the lengthy nature of some monetary transmission mechanisms.
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The Russian authorities have been battling strong depreciation pressures, with the rouble having lost around 30% of its value since early 2023 (and inflationary pressures having risen strongly). The main reason for this is the declining supply of foreign exchange from foreign trade transactions, due to (i) a steady rise in the share of export contracts denominated in roubles, and (ii) the declining share of export earnings in foreign currency converted into roubles. To address the latter problem, on 16 October the authorities imposed a surrender requirement for export proceeds, which has proved highly effective at stabilising the exchange rate. However, despite this and a sharp rise in the policy rate of 7.5 pp in total since June, inflation has continued to accelerate, reflecting the ongoing expansionary fiscal stance, but also the lengthy nature of some monetary transmission mechanisms.
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